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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (Penal Code 
Sections 186.20 et seq.) was enacted in 1988 in response to a perceived “state of crisis . . . 
caused by violent street gangs” throughout the state.1 Since its enactment, courts and 
practitioners have struggled repeatedly to properly interpret and apply key provisions of 
the Act. 
 The California Supreme Court has addressed various aspects of the Act on eleven 
occasions.2 In the seventh of those cases, People v. Sengpadychith,3 a frustrated Court 
began its opinion as follows:  
Step by step, this court continues its struggle through the thicket of 
statutory construction issues presented by the California Street Terrorism 
and Prevention Act of 1988, also known as the STEP Act.4
In the five years since Sengpadychith was decided, the lower courts have 
remained in disarray on several crucial aspects of the Act, and the Supreme Court has 
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1 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.21 (West 2006). 
 
2 People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1996); People v. Loeun, 947 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1997); People v. 
Zermeno, 986 P.2d 196 (Cal. 1999); People v. Jefferson, 980 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1999); People v. Robles, 5 
P.3d 176 (Cal. 2000); People v. Castaneda, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000); People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739 
(Cal. 2001); People v. Garcia, 52 P.3d 648 (Cal. 2002); People v. Montes, 73 P.3d 489 (Cal. 2003); Robert 
L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951 (Cal. 2003); People v. Briceno, 99 P.3d 1007 (Cal. 2004); People v. 
Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080 (Cal. 2004); People v. Lopez, 103 P.3d 270 (Cal. 2005). 
 
3 27 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2001). 
 
4 Sengpadychith at 741. 
 
2only briefly and cursorily revisited the “thicket.”5 Many of the problems at the root of 
the widespread confusion amongst the Appellate Courts, however, seem soluble through 
a common sense application of related case law and basic principles of statutory 
construction. 
II.  THE KEY PROVISIONS OF THE STEP ACT 
 
The two most widely used provisions of the STEP Act are Penal Code sections 
186.22(a) and 186.22(b).  Subdivision (a)—the “substantive gang charge”—criminalizes 
criminal street gang membership rising to the level of “active participation,” while 
subdivision (b)—the “gang enhancement”—increases penalties for felonies committed 
with the intent to facilitate criminal gang activity.6
5 Except for Hernandez, all of the post-Sengpadychith Supreme Court opinions have been solely concerned 
with clarifying the somewhat complex sentencing provisions of Penal Code section 186.22: People v. 
Garcia, 52 P.3d 648 (Cal. 2002 (the extension of a personal use firearm enhancement, under section 
12022.53(e)(1) to aiders and abettors, convicted of gang related felonies under section 186.22(b) does not 
require a conviction of the direct perpetrator); People v. Montes, 73 P.3d 489 (Cal. 2003) (alternate 
sentencing provision in section 186.22(b)(5) provides for increased punishment when the underlying non-
gang related felony carries a life penalty); Robert L. v. Superior Court, __ P.3d __ (Cal. 2003) (section 
186.22(d) is neither a sentence enhancement nor a substantive offense, but an alternate sentencing 
provision allowing gang-related misdemeanors to be sentenced as felonies); People v. Briceno, __ P.3d __ 
(Cal. 2004) (felonies enhanced under section 186.22(b) are “serious felonies” within the meaning of Penal 
Code section 1192.7); People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080 (Cal. 2004) (the trial court is permitted, but not 
required, to bifurcate the section 186.22(b) gang enhancement); People v. Lopez, 103 P.3d 270 (Cal. 2005) 
(violent felonies punishable by life are not subject to the 10 year 186.22(b) enhancement). 
6 A sustained enhancement adds two to four years to the punishment for most felonies, five years for 
“serious” felonies, ten years for “violent” felonies, and increases to life the punishment for certain crimes 
such as witness intimidation and carjacking.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2006). 
 
3III.  “CRIMINAL STREET GANG”: DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS 
 
A.  The Existence of the Criminal Street Gang 
Proof of either the substantive charge or the enhancement depends on the 
prosecution first proving the existence and nature of the criminal street gang in question.7
“Criminal street gang” is defined in section 186.22(f) as  
any ongoing organization, association or group of three or more persons, 
whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the 
commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs 
(1) to (25), inclusive, of subdivision (e), having a common name or 
common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or 
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 
activity.8
The definitional problems with this requirement have largely revolved around the 
following phrases from the statute: 
! “any ongoing organization” 
! “one of its primary activities”   
! “pattern of criminal gang activity” 
! “whose members” 
B.  “Any Ongoing Organization”: Umbrellas, Caravans, Cliques and Factions 
In Northern California alone, there are hundreds of Hispanic street gangs, each 
gang having anywhere from a handful to a hundreds of members.9 The gangs’ 
 
7 See In re Nathaniel C., 279 Cal.Rptr. 236, 245. (1991) (“It is incumbent upon the prosecution in seeking 
an enhancement under section 18.22, subdivision (b), to prove through competent evidence the elements of 
a ‘criminal street gang’ as set out in the statute”). 
 
8 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006). 
 
9 Bill Valentine, GANG INTELLIGENCE MANUAL: IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING MODERN-DAY 
VIOLENT GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES (Paladin Press 1995), at p.23.  “The Hispanic street gangs in 
Northern California ( . . . north of Bakersfield) number in the hundreds . . . . The gangs may have as few as 
five or six members or hundreds.” 
 
4membership is fluid, the gangs’ names change, and gangs migrate throughout the state.10 
Thus, the transitory nature and changing membership of these neighborhood gangs can 
make it difficult to prove that members of a specific, named gang have committed crimes 
with the requisite frequency and consistency for the gang to meet the statutory definition 
of a criminal street gang.   
 The nature of Californian Hispanic street gangs in particular raises unique 
problems of pleading and proof.  Almost all Californian Hispanic street gangs fall into 
one of two categories: norteno and sureno;11 norteno gangs are predominant in Northern 
California, while sureno gangs are predominant in Southern California.12 The norteno 
gangs tend to wear red and display the number 14 (for the letter “N”).13 The sureno 
gangs wear blue and display the number 13 (for the letter “M” for Mexican Mafia—the 
reputed prison gang predecessor and now current ally of sureno gangs).14 Although the 
numerous gangs on each side share common philosophies (dominance over encroaching 
or potentially encroaching gangs from the opposite side), as well as similar color 
 
10 See Gangs; A Community Response, California Attorney General’s Office Crime and Violence 
Prevention Center (June 2003), at p.7 (“[G]angs identify themselves by a name derived from a street, 
neighborhood or housing project where they are based . . . . Gang names can change as the gang’s activities 
or membership does”); also THE DISPATCHER, Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, 1999, at p.42 
(detailing migratory trends of youth gangs).  Available at http://www.alads.org/alads2/dispmag.pdf. 
 
11 See Bill Valentine, GANG INTELLIGENCE MANUAL: IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING MODERN-DAY 





5preferences and symbols, few of the neighborhood gangs on each side engage in any 
coordinated collaborative enterprises.15 
Many of these small gangs adopt neighborhood-specific names, such as the 
“Barrio North Side” gang16 or the “Kilbreth Street Norteno”17 gang.  The significance of 
the upper case “N” in “Kilbreth Street Norteno” is that the gang’s members have created 
a proper name for a (lower case “n”) norteno gang, i.e., a gang whose members share the 
Californian Hispanic “northerner” philosophy.  
 Despite the discrete and apparently autonomous nature of these numerous, small 
Hispanic “neighborhood” gangs, prosecutors frequently elect to charge defendants as 
active participants in, or facilitating the criminal activities of, simply, “the Nortenos,” or 
“the Surenos.”  The reason for this is obvious; there are thousands of sureno and norteno 
gang members in California,18 and if every neighborhood gang can be shown to be 
nothing more than a subordinate “set” or “clique” forming just a tiny part of a vast 
unitary “Sureno Gang” or “Norteno Gang,” the task of proving the existence of the gang 
becomes a hundred times easier when a complaint alleges participation in, or facilitation 
of criminal activity by “the Surenos” or “the Nortenos.”  
 
15 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT, National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations (2005), at 
p.8 (quoting Sergeant Wes McBride). 
 
16 See People v. Valdez, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 140 (1997). 
 
17 See In re Jose P., 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (2003). 
 
18 See National Drug Intelligence Center California Northern and Eastern Districts Drug Threat 
Assessment (January 2001) (“the California Department of Justice estimates there could be as many as 
170,000 Hispanic gang members in California, ranging in age from 14 to 41”).  Available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs/653/meth.htm. 
 
6The doubtful existence of a vast unitary “Norteno” or “Sureno” gang overseeing 
hundreds of smaller “sub-gangs” was first addressed on appeal in People v. Valdez.19 Mr. 
Valdez was one of a number of youths gathered together from various norteno gangs for 
the one-time purpose of attacking some sureno gang members.20 The Valdez court held 
that the group could not be proven to be a street gang by resort to evidence of prior 
activities drawn from the entire population of norteno gang members, because—
according to the testimony of the gang expert at trial—“Norteno and Sureno are not the 
names of gangs.”21 The group was neither a norteno gang, nor was it part of a greater 
“Norteno gang”; instead, it was merely a “caravan” of nortenos taken from seven 
different norteno gangs.22 
In contrast, the prosecution gang expert in In re Jose P.23 testified at trial that 
various Salinas area norteno gangs were, in fact, “cliques or factions within the larger 
Norteno gang”24 and that the cliques were “loyal to one another and to the larger Norteno 
street gang.”25 The appellant in In re Jose P. cited People v. Valdez26 for the proposition 
that “evidence of gang activity must be specific to a particular local street gang, not to the 
 
19 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 (1997). 
 
20 Id. at 138, 140. 
 
21 Id. at 143. 
 
22 Id. at 143. 
 
23 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (2003). 
 
24 Id. at 813. 
 
25 Id. at 813. 
 
26 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 (1997). 
 
7larger Norteno organization.”27 The Jose P. court, however, held that expert testimony in 
one case does not necessarily apply to another, and that in this case the expert testified 
that there was indeed one unitary Norteno gang, of which the Salinas area norteno gangs 
were merely subordinate “subgroups.”28 
 Although law enforcement experts consistently testify at trial that the terms 
“Norteno” and “Sureno” are the names of vast unitary gangs, rather than adjectives used 
to describe discrete small gangs with similar raisons d’etre, no published texts support 
the law enforcement position.  In fact, the few reputable published materials addressing 
the composition of Californian Hispanic street gangs soundly contradict the view that 
Norteno and Sureno are two huge unitary gangs.  For example, Sergeant Wes McBride—
president of the California Gang Investigators Association—wrote in the 1999 edition of 
the Dispatcher: 
A common misunderstanding is that these two movements [norteno and 
sureno] are in fact two large gangs controlling California.  In fact, they are 
only street gangs from divergent geographical locations that have adopted 
opposing philosophical divisions that exist in many states between 
northern and southern regions.29 
Sergeant McBride’s view, while apparently not shared by many testifying officers, 
is shared by the National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations.  The NAGIA’s 
2005 National Gang Threat Assessment report noted the following: 
 
27 Id. at 816. 
 
28 Id. at 813, 816. 
 
29 THE DISPATCHER, Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, 1999, at p.42.  Available at 
http://www.alads.org/alads2/dispmag.pdf.  Ironically, the resumes of many of the law enforcement officers 
who testify contrary to Sergeant McBride’s view are dominated by training seminars conducted by 
Sergeant McBride and the California Gang Investigators Association. 
 
8. . . Surenos (Southerners) and Nortenos (Northerners) [are] umbrella 
terms for Hispanic street gangs in California [] used to distinguish whether the 
gang is from the northern or southern part of the state . . . .30 
Sureno, or Sur 13, is a banner under which most southern 
California Hispanic gangs gather . . . .31 
[T]he term norteno is used to describe an entire category of
California street gangs . . . .32 
[J]ust as Sureno gangs are not aligned with each other, Norteno gangs are 
not necessarily aligned with other Nortenos.33 
Furthermore, in the law-enforcement oriented “Gang Intelligence Manual,” Bill 
Valentine observed that “[Sur-13 and Norte-14] are generic terms only.  There are 
hundreds of active Sureno gangs that regard each other as enemies, just as there are 
Norteno gangs that do.”34 
If it is true, as reported in the NAGIA’s 2005 National Gang Threat Assessment, 
that “the terms nortenos and surenos are no longer sufficient to describe California street 
gangs,”35 then it is also no longer sufficient to charge California street gang members as 
simply “Nortenos” or “Surenos.” 
 
30 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT, National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations (2005), at 
p.8. 
 
31 Id. at 31 (quoting Sergeant Wes McBride). 
 
32 Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
 
33 Id. at 8. 
 
34 Bill Valentine, GANG INTELLIGENCE MANUAL: IDENTIFYING AND UNDERSTANDING MODERN-DAY 
VIOLENT GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES (Paladin Press 1995), at p.23. 
 
35 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT, National Alliance of Gang Investigators Associations (2005), at 
p.8. 
 
9C.  “Pattern of Criminal Gang Activity”: Predicate Acts 
To prove the existence of the gang, it must be shown that “the gang’s members 
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 
activity.”36 This “pattern” must be shown by proof of  
the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or 
solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more of 
[thirty specified “enumerated”] offenses, provided at least one of these offenses 
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of those offenses 
occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the offenses were committed 
on separate occasions, or by two or more persons.37 
 
The enumerated offenses include many “serious”38 and “violent”39 felonies, as 
well as ordinarily less serious offenses, such as grand theft and felony vandalism.40 To 
meet the statutory requirements of number (two or more) and timing (within three years 
of each other), prosecutors typically use the charged offense as the most recent, and one 
 
36 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006). 
 
37 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(e) (West 2006). 
 
38 Within the meaning of California Penal Code section 1192.7(c). 
 
39 Within the meaning of California Penal Code section 667.5(c). 
 
40 The complete list of offenses enumerated in the Act reads as follows: 
 (1) Assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury . . . (2) 
Robbery . . . (3) Unlawful homicide or manslaughter . . . (4) The sale, possession for sale, transportation, 
manufacture, offer for sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances . . . (5) Shooting at an inhabited 
dwelling or occupied motor vehicle . . . (6) Discharging . . . a firearm from a motor vehicle . . . (7) Arson . . . 
(8) The intimidation of witnesses and victims . . . (9) Grand theft . . . (10) Grand theft of any firearm, 
vehicle, trailer, or vessel . . . (11) Burglary . . . (12) Rape . . . (13) Looting . . . (14) Money laundering . . . ; 
(15) Kidnapping . . . (16) Mayhem . . . (17) Aggravated mayhem . . . (18) Torture . . . (19) Felony 
extortion . . . (20) Felony vandalism . . . (21) Carjacking . . . (22) The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm, 
as defined in Section 12072 (23) Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other [concealed firearm] . . . (24) 
Threats to commit crimes resulting in death or great bodily injury, as defined in Section 422 (25) Theft and 
unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle, as defined in section 10851 of the Vehicle Code (26) Felony theft 
of an access card or account information, as defined in Section 484e (27) Counterfeiting, designing, using, 
attempting to use an access card, as defined in Section 484f  (28) Felony fraudulent use of an access card or 
account information, as defined in Section 484g (29) Unlawful use of personal identifying information to 
obtain credit, goods, services, or medical information, as defined in Section 530.5 (30) Wrongfully 
obtaining Department of Motor Vehicles documentation, as defined in Section 529.7.  CAL. PEN. CODE § 
186.22(e) (West 2006). 
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or more predicate offenses (i.e., offenses of a type enumerated in the Act) committed by 
the defendant or other gang members resulting in convictions41 and having occurred 
within the preceding three years. 
Although the charged offense and only one prior will suffice as a “pattern of 
criminal gang activity,”42 prosecutors frequently allege more.  One reason is that, should 
the defendant be acquitted of the offense supporting the gang enhancement, there would 
then need to be a minimum two prior predicate acts proven in order to convict on the 
substantive gang charge.  Also, a litany of prior gang offenses serves the additional 
purposes of proving that the gang has as one of its primary activities the commission of 
one or more of the enumerated crimes,43 and that the defendant had knowledge of the 
gang’s criminal activities.44 
Two problems arise out of the “pattern” requirement.  One is purely 
interpretational, while the other concerns the use of expert witnesses’ testimony at trial.  
Although the statutory language appears clear; “whose members individually or 
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,”45 the 
Courts of Appeal have held that the predicate acts need not be gang related, nor do the 
people committing the predicate offenses need to be gang members at the time of the 
 
41 It is not necessary to prove that the predicate acts resulted in convictions.  See People v. Zermeno, 986 
P.2d 196, 198 fn 2 (Cal. 1999).   
 
42 People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 725 (Cal. 1996);. 
 
43 Required under Penal Code sections 186.22(a) and (b) to prove the existence of the gang.  (See next 
section.) 
44 Required under Penal Code section 186.22(a) to prove active participation in a criminal street gang.  (See 
section IV, infra.) 
 
45 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
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acts’ commission.46 Can the existence of a gang really be proven by evidence of non-
gang-related crimes committed years before the perpetrator even considers joining the 
gang?  Surely this is not what the Augborne court meant to say.    
Prosecution “experts”—who are not usually qualified as experts in legislative 
history —further abuse the “predicate acts” requirement at trial by confidently asserting 
that the enumerated crimes were selected because the Legislature deemed them to be 
“gang crimes.”  This is simply not so.  Nevertheless, trial courts invariably allow 
prosecution gang experts to improperly imply, by characterizing the statutorily 
enumerated offenses as per se “gang crimes,” that street gang members are more prone to 
commit those offenses than other groups or individuals. 
 D. “One of its Primary Activities”:  How Criminal Are Criminal Street Gangs? 
 
To prove the existence of the gang, the prosecution must also prove that the gang 
has “as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts 
enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, of subdivision (e).”47 
“Primary” is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary as “first or highest in 
rank, quality or importance.”48 If the statute said “as its primary activity” then there 
would be no difficulty in applying that definition.  The problem is that the statute says 
“one of its primary activities,”49 defying the commonly understood definition of 
“primary” as the first or highest in rank, quality or importance.  So, how can several 
activities be first or highest in rank, quality or importance?  In 2001, thirteen years after 
 
46 See People v. Augborne, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 264 (2002).  
 
47 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006). 
 
48 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Fourth Edition (Houghton Mifflin 2000). 
 
49 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
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the enactment of the STEP Act, the California Supreme Court addressed the definitional 
issue of “primary activities” in People v. Sengpadychith.50 The Court looked to 
Webster’s International Dictionary and found that Webster’s listed “chief” and 
“principal” as synonyms.51 But instead of attempting to solve the conundrum of multiple 
“primary” activities, the Court proceeded to ratify the grammatical contradiction in the 
statute with more word abuse of the exact same kind by stating that “one of its primary 
activities”52 means the same as “one of its ‘chief’ or ‘principal’ occupations.”53 
Not only did the Supreme Court compound the problem of multiple primary 
activities during its foray into the linguistic thicket of the STEP Act, courtesy of 
Sengpadychith,54 but it also took the following muddled stab at providing a clearer 
standard for frequency of primary activities: 
Sufficient proof of the gang’s primary activities might consist of evidence 
that the group’s members consistently and repeatedly have committed 
criminal activity listed in the gang statute.  Also sufficient might be expert 
testimony, as occurred in Gardeley. [Citation]  There, a police gang 
expert testified that the gang . . . was primarily engaged in the sale of 
narcotics and witness intimidation, both statutorily enumerated 
felonies . . . . The gang expert based his opinion on conversations he had 
with Gardeley and fellow gang members, and on “his personal 
investigation of hundreds of crimes committed by gang members,” 
together with information from colleagues in his own police department 
and in other law enforcement agencies.55 
 
50 27 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2001). 
 
51 Sengpadychith at 744 (citing WEBSTER’S INTERNAT. DICT. (2d ed. 1942)). 
 
52 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
53 Sengpadychith at 744 (emphasis added). 
 
54 People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2001). 
 
55 Sengpadychith at 744 (emphasis in original). 
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The first sentence alone might have gone some way toward clarifying what kind 
of evidence proves that the commission of enumerated crimes is one of the gang’s 
primary activities, had the Court said “must” and not “might.”  But even if some value 
were assigned to that first sentence by reading “might” as “must” (or even, “should”), 
that value is diminished, if not negated entirely, by the second sentence, which appears to 
suggests that expert testimony can prove primary activities in a way that falls short of the 
consistent and repeated commission of enumerated acts.  Nevertheless, the Court’s use of 
italics in the first sentence certainly implies that the Court placed some importance on the 
“consistently and repeatedly” phrase, and presumably did not intend to lessen that 
importance by allowing proof by a different means of a lesser degree of activity than 
“consistent[] and repeated[]” commission of enumerated crimes.  The most reasonable 
interpretation of this part of the Sengpadychith opinion, therefore, is that the “primary 
activities” element must be proven by evidence that the gang’s members consistently and 
repeatedly committed enumerated acts, and that the same standard may be met by 
evidence presented in the form of expert testimony, as occurred in Gardeley.56 Any other 
reading of this passage would essentially render it useless in its entirety. 
Implicit in the “primary activities” requirement is the notion that gangs must be, 
at the very least, more criminally active than society at large.  No matter how tempting it 
is to assume that popular preconceptions about gangs are true, high levels of criminality 
among gangs must still be demonstrated reliably at trial to prove this requirement.  The 
question is how?  In practice, gang experts routinely present a list of gang crimes which 
have occurred in the county in recent years and then proceed to state that based on their 
 
56 People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1996). 
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experience investigating gang crime, the primary activities of Gang X are the commission 
of this crime, that crime, and the other crime—all enumerated in the statute.57 This kind 
of conclusory anecdotal evidence—impressive as it is to a jury—tells us nothing about 
the per capita crime rate of gang members versus non-gang members without any 
accompanying information as to the percentage of gang members among the local 
population, and local crime rates among gang members versus the general population, or 
among other groups or organizations. 
In People v. Gamez (1991),58 the defendant claimed that the statutory definition of 
criminal street gang could easily encompass such organizations as the Los Angeles Police 
Department.59 The Court of Appeal countered that, although members of the LAPD may 
have committed the requisite number of predicate offenses,60 the commission of those 
offenses was not a “primary activity” of the department because the crimes were 
committed by LAPD officers acting in a separate capacity, albeit while on duty.61 The 
Gamez court’s conclusion seemed to be based on the capacity of the perpetrators of the 
enumerated crimes, rather than the rank, quality or importance ascribed to the conduct.  
However, when the Supreme Court visited the primary activities issue a decade later in 
 
57 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(e) (West 2006).  As of 2005, twenty-five offenses were enumerated.  The list 
was commonly referred to in gang officers’ vernacular as “the dirty twenty-five.”  Not surprisingly, since 
its recent expansion to thirty crimes, it is now referred to even more commonly as “the dirty thirty.” 
 
58 286 Cal.Rptr. 894 (1991). 
 
59 Gamez at 901. 
 
60 The Gamez opinion somewhat portentously predated the Los Angeles Police Department “Rampart 
Scandal,” wherein LAPD anti-gang CRASH Unit officers were convicted of several serious felonies, 
including bank robbery and theft of seized cocaine.  See Rampart Scandal Timeline at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/cron.html. 
 
61 Gamez at 901. 
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Sengpadychith,62 it appeared to cite Gamez for the proposition that organizations such as 
the LAPD are not criminal street gangs because enumerated offenses are committed by 
members only on an “occasional” basis.63 
If the LAPD is not a criminal street gang because its members appear to commit 
enumerated crimes only occasionally, couldn’t the same be said for norteno and sureno 
street gangs, absent any evidence to the contrary?  Despite popular preconceptions of 
gangs consisting of hordes of marauding superpredators,64 the reality, according to one 
expert, is that gang life is “a very dull life.  For the most part, gang members do very 
little—sleep, get up late, hang around, brag a lot, eat again, drink, hang around some 
more.”65 
Even if it can be proven that a disproportionate number of crimes are committed 
by gang members, that fact would not necessarily prove a causal relationship between 
gangs and crime.  If already delinquent youths join gangs and continue to commit crimes 
at the same level as if they had not joined the gang, then a distinction can be made 
between the primary activity of the gang, and the primary activities of its members.66 
62 27 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2001). 
 
63 Sengpadychith at 744. 
 
64 See John J. DiIulio Jr., The Coming of the Superpredators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, November 27, 1995, 
at p.23 (predicting the taking over of America by tens of thousands of “severely morally impoverished 
juvenile super-predators” who “fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment” and “live by 
the meanest code of the meanest streets”). 
 
65 M.W. Klein, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG, (Oxford University Press 1995), at p.11. 
 
66 See Finn-Aage Esbensen, Preventing Adolescent Gang Involvement, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, September 
2000, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, at pp.5-6.  Esbensen noted that research suggested that “while the gang environment facilitates 
delinquency, gang members are already delinquent prior to joining the gang.”  Esbensen also noted, 
however, that “rates of delinquency increase dramatically during the period of gang membership.”  See also 
James C. Howell, Youth Gangs: An Overview, Juvenile Justice Bulletin, August 1998, U.S. Department of 
Justice Office of Justice Programs Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.  A 1997 survey 
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Unlike the “pattern of criminal gang activity” requirement, which must be proven by 
evidence of “members individually or collectively” committing enumerated offenses,67 
the “primary activities” requirement must be proven by evidence of “its [i.e., the gang’s] 
primary activities [being] the commission of one or more of the [enumerated] criminal 
acts.”68 
The notion that Hispanic street gangs may merely provide an attractive means of 
association for the independently criminally minded is supported by the available 
statistical data.  In 2000, Hispanics made up 12.5 percent of the United States’ 
population,69 and 49 percent of the nation’s street gang membership.70 Thus, Hispanics 
were more than six times more likely to be in a gang than non-Hispanics.  Based on the 
foregoing, if gang membership substantially contributes to criminality (rather than vice 
versa), then one would expect to find noticeably disproportionate Hispanic per capita 
crime rates, especially in regions with a large Hispanic population.  However, one recent 
sampling of local inmates broken down by race tends to refute this assumption.  During 
late May of 2006, the male population detained in Stanislaus County’s Modesto Men’s 
Jail and Public Safety Center was divided between 45 percent Hispanic and 55 percent 
 
of Denver, Colorado youth found that the 14% of teenagers who claimed to be gang members were 
responsible for 89% of all serious violent juvenile offenses. 
 
67 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
68 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
69 Elizabeth M. Grieco & Rachel C. Cassidy, Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin, Census 2000 Brief,
U.S. Census Bureau (March 2000). 
 




non-Hispanic.71 In Stanislaus County generally, males between ages 18 and 40 were 
divided at that time between approximately 42 percent Hispanic and 58 percent non-
Hispanic.72 
 The closeness of the in-custody and out-of-custody figures indicates that Hispanic 
males as a class are negligibly more criminal than non-Hispanic males.  This in-custody 
racial parity further shows that the reputed high level of gang membership amongst 
Hispanics has little impact on the overall Hispanic per capita crime rate.  Rather, a 
disproportionate representation of gang members within a proportionately represented 
Hispanic in-custody population would indicate that instead of gang formation causing 
increased criminality, as popularly believed, the opposite may be true; gang members are 
already predisposed toward criminal activity, and an individual’s membership within a 
gang has little impact upon his continuing criminality. 
 In light of the wealth of statistical information available, and the conclusions that 
can be drawn from it, courts deserve more than the anecdotal evidence deemed sufficient 
in Gardeley to prove “primary activities.”73 Instead of police officers’ lurid recitations of 
highlights from the gang unit’s water cooler, courts and juries should be hearing more 
meaningful testimony from social scientists and demographers as to the relationship 
between gang membership/formation and crime—especially when it is likely that while 
gang members might be delinquently oriented, the existence of the gang has little to do 
with their levels of criminality. 
 
71 Based on daily jail rosters provided in response to subpoena duces tecum in People v. Torres, Stanislaus 
County Superior Court case # 1092534. 
 
72 Based on California Department of Finance Demographic Research Unit estimates, available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/DEMOGRAP/DRU_datafiles/Race/RaceData_2000-2050.htm. 
 
73 People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1996). 
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IV.  “ACTIVE PARTICIPATION”: WHAT IS A GANG MEMBER? 
 
Active participation in a criminal street gang in violation of Penal Code section 
186.22(a) is punishable as a felony or as a misdemeanor.74 A felony conviction under 
section 186.22(a) counts as a “strike” under California’s Three Strikes Law75 and carries 
a maximum punishment of three years in state prison.76 
Subdivision (a)—the “substantive gang charge”—proscribes active participation 
“in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged 
in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers or assists in 
any felonious conduct by members of that gang . . .”77 
Relying on the United States Supreme Court case of Scales v. United States,78 the 
California Supreme Court in People v. Castaneda79 held that subdivision (a) required that 
the defendant was more than a nominal or passive member, the defendant had knowledge 
of the gang’s members’ involvement in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and that the 
defendant willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted in criminal conduct by gang 
members.80 The Castaneda court held that “willful promot[ion], further[ance], or 
 
74 A crime punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor is commonly known as a “wobbler.” 
 
75 As a “serious felony” within the meaning of California Penal Code section 1192.7(c). 
 
76 Like many felonies, the mitigated term is sixteen months, the mid term is two years, and the aggravated 
term is three years.  See CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2006). 
 
77 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2006). 
 
78 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
 
79 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000). 
 
80 Castaneda at 284-285. 
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assist[ance] in criminal gang conduct” was equivalent to “aid[ing] and abet[ting] a 
separate felony offense committed by gang members.”81 
Despite the clear language of the Castaneda opinion, lower courts have since held 
that the promotion/furtherance/assistance prong may be satisfied by a defendant 
committing the charged offense82 (as opposed to a “separate offense”83) alone or as a 
direct perpetrator84 (as opposed to “aiding and abetting”85).  In People v. Ngoun,86 the 
Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized that the “gravamen of [the substantive offense] 
is the participation in the gang itself”87 (citing People v. Herrera88), but went on to state 
that someone acting alone could satisfy the promotion/furtherance/assistance prong 
because “an active gang member who directly perpetrates a gang-related offense 
‘contributes’ to the accomplishment of the offense no less than does an active gang 
member who aids or abets or who is otherwise connected to such conduct.”89 
What the Ngoun court missed, despite its reference to Herrera,90 is that inherent 
in the concept of “participation” in a gang is interaction or collaboration with other gang 
members, hence the unambiguous requirement in Castaneda that the defendant be proven 
 
81 Castaneda at 283. 
 
82 People v. McMahon, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 256  (2005). 
 
83 Castaneda at 283. 
 
84 People v. Ngoun, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 837, 839-840 (2001). 
 
85 Castaneda at 283. 
 
86 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 837, 839-840 (2001). 
 
87 Ngoun at 839. 
 
88 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 307 (1999).   
 
89 Ngoun at 839-840. 
 
90 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 307 (1999 
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to have aided and abetted other gang members on a separate occasion.91 The Court of 
Appeal in Ngoun concluded its opinion by inviting the CALJIC committee to abandon its 
paraphrasing of Castaneda’s “aid and abet” language and revise it to conform with the 
Ngoun “direct perpetration” holding.92 
 Just recently, in People v. Lamas,93 the Fourth District Court of Appeal, citing 
Ngoun, similarly held that direct perpetration of the charged offense by a gang member 
would be sufficient to meet the promote/further/assist requirement of section 186.22(a), 
dismissing the “aid and abet a separate felony” language of Castaneda as “an oft-
misinterpreted snippet . . . ripped from its context.”94 
Five years after the Ngoun court’s invitation to conform the relevant jury 
instruction to its holding, such a change has yet to occur.  CALCRIM 1400 (the recent 
successor to CALJIC 6.50) retains the “aid and abet” language of Castaneda95 and does 
not mention direct perpetration.96 
As well as the confusion amongst lower courts as to what the Supreme Court 
really meant when it said when it said that a defendant “must aid and abet a separate 
 
91 Castaneda at 283. 
 
92 Ngoun at 840. 
 
93 *Cal.Rptr.3d* (June 20, 2006). 
 
94 Lamas at *. 
 
95 Castaneda at 283. 
 
96 See CALCRIM 1400, “Active Participation in Criminal Street Gang” (Judicial Council of California 
2006) (“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime the People must prove that . . . [a] member of the 
gang committed the crime . . . , the defendant knew the gang member intended to commit the crime . . . , 
the gang member intended to aid and abet the gang member in committing the crime [and] the defendant’s 
words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the commission of the crime”). 
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felony offense committed by gang members”97 to be convicted under 186.22(a), there 
remains a far more serious unresolved interpretational problem: the meaning of “gang 
member,” a term peppered throughout the STEP Act, yet undefined anywhere in the 
Penal Code. 
 Under the STEP Act, a criminal street gang is an organization “whose members 
individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang 
activity.”98 To be convicted of violating section 186.22(a), a defendant must have 
“knowledge that [the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity”99 and must “willfully promote[], further[] or assist[] in any felonious 
conduct by members of that gang.”100  To sustain a penalty enhancement under section 
186.22(b), a defendant must commit a felony with “the specific intent to promote, further, 
or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.”101 
The enactment of the STEP Act in 1988 was not the first time that the term “gang 
member” had been used in a penal statute without definition.  Sixty-seven years ago, in 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey,102 the defendant challenged as constitutionally vague a 1934 New 
Jersey law punishing “any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a 
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons . . . .”103 The United States 
 
97 People v. Castaneda, 3 P.3d 278, 283 (Cal. 2000). 
 
98 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
99 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
100 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
101 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
102 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
 
103 Lanzetta at 452. 
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Supreme Court held that the statute violated due process because its terms were “so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ 
as to its application.”104 One of the unconstitutionally vague terms in the statute was the 
term “known to be a member.”105 The Supreme Court found two problems with this term; 
one was whether the word “known” required actual membership or whether reputed 
membership was sufficient,106 the other problem with the term was that the statute failed 
to indicate “what constitutes membership or how one may join” a gang.107 
 The STEP Act’s abundant use of the undefined term “gang member” was attacked 
for vagueness in the 1991 case of People v. Green.108 Notwithstanding the fatal 
constitutional problems that the United States Supreme Court had found with the same 
undefined term over half a century earlier, the Green court declared that “member” and 
“membership” were “terms of ordinary meaning and require[d] no further definition.”109 
Further, declared the Green court, “member” had been judicially defined by the United 
State Supreme Court in Galvan v. Press110 as a person “bear[ing] a relationship to an 
organization that is not accidental, artificial or unconsciously in appearance only.”111 
104 Lanzetta at 453, 457-458 (citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
105 Lanzetta at 452. 
 
106 Lanzetta at 458. 
 
107 Lanzetta at 458. 
 
108 278 Cal.Rptr. 140 (1991). 
 
109 People v. Green, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, __ (1991) (citing In re De La O, 59 Cal.2d 128 (1963)). 
 
110 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
 
111 Green at 145 (citing Galvan v. Press 347 U.S. 522, 528 (1954)).   
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What the Green court failed to appreciate was that while the term “member” might not 
require further definition, “gang member” might.
In Galvan v. Press,112 the Supreme Court held that aliens could be deported under 
the Internal Security Act of 1950 if they had become members of the Communist 
Party.113 All that was required was that the alien was “aware that he was joining an 
organization known as the Communist Party which operates as a distinct and active 
political organization, and that he did so of his own free will.”114 There was no need to 
show that the alien knew of the Party’s advocacy of the violent overthrow of the United 
States Government.115 Thus, the issue in Galvan—like Scales and unlike Lanzetta—was 
not the method of acquiring membership, but the depth of membership, once acquired.  
 Distinguishing Lanzetta, the Green court noted that, unlike the New Jersey law, 
the STEP Act did not use the term “known” and therefore the STEP Act’s references to 
“gang members” referred to actual gang members.116 The fact that the STEP Act, like 
the New Jersey statute in Lanzetta, fails to indicate how one might join a gang had, 
according to the Green court, been resolved by cases such as Scales “which also involved 
[a statute] failing to specify those acts by which a person might be deemed a member.”117 
The Green court’s reference to Scales is unhelpful in that Scales, like Galvan, turned on 
the issue of the depth of the defendant’s membership, not the method of acquiring 
 
112 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
 
113 Galvan at 525. 
 
114 Galvan at 528. 
 
115 Galvan at 530. 
 
116 People v. Green, 278 Cal.Rptr. 140, 146 (1991) 
 
117 Green at 146. 
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membership, something which was recognized in Lanzetta as the first step in defining 
membership of a street gang—a type of organization which, unlike the Communist Party 
and most other political organizations, does not collect a membership fee or hand out 
membership cards.118 
 In People v. Englebrecht,119 the Court of Appeal faced a similar challenge to that 
raised in Lanzetta and Green, but in the context of a civil injunction enjoining “members” 
of the Posole street gang from engaging in certain collective activities amounting to a 
public nuisance.120 The Englebrecht court rejected the defendant’s argument that “gang 
member” should be considered synonymous with “active participant” as defined in Green 
as one who “devotes all, or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang,”121 as 
well as the prosecution’s argument that the court should adopt as a judicial definition the 
criteria used by law enforcement to validate and document youths as “gang members.”122 
Instead, the Englebrecht court defined “gang member” as an “active gang member,” i.e.,
one who meets a similar definition of “active participant” under section 186.22(a) except 
that, in the context of a civil injunction, the gang has as its primary activities the acts 
constituting the public nuisance, and instead of engaging in a pattern of criminal activity, 
 
118 See Gangs; A Community Response, California Attorney General’s Office Crime and Violence 
Prevention Center (June 2003), at p.28 (describing how gang members are “jumped in” to a gang by 
submitting to a gang beating.  Other methods of acquiring membership include “sponsorship” by an 
existing member, or completion of a criminal “assignment”). 
 
119 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 (2001).  
 
120 Englebrecht at 742. 
 
121 Englebrecht at 753. 
 
122 Id. At the time of the Englebrecht case, the California Department of Justice Gang Task Force classified 
as an active gang member anyone meeting two or more of the following criteria:  (1) Subject admits being a 
member of the gang (2) Subject has tattoos, clothing, etc., that are only associated with certain gangs (3) 
Subject has been arrested while participating with a known gang (4) Information that places the subject 
with a gang has been obtained by a reliable informant (5) Close association with known gang members has 
been confirmed.  See Englebrecht at 753. 
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the gang’s members engage in the acts constituting the public nuisance.123 Also, “[t]he 
participation must be more than nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical.”124 Thus, 
the Englebrecht “active gang member” formulation fell somewhere between the non-
criminal “inactive” or “passive” member and the criminal “active participant.”   
 A version of the Englebrecht “active member” definition would, at first glance, 
seem appropriate in the context of the STEP Act.  Unfortunately, such a definition 
compels infinite regression, ultimately rendering it unusable; for example, if a gang 
member is defined as somebody who has associated in some way with another gang 
member, then at some point in history there has to be an immaculately conceived gang 
member, i.e., a person who became a gang member without any association with an 
existing gang member. 
 The Green court may have been correct when it stated that “member” is a term of 
ordinary meaning requiring no further definition, but as long as gangs do not hand out 
membership cards, the term “gang member” remains just as vulnerable to diverse 
definitions today as it did sixty-seven years ago in Lanzetta.125 Therefore, the entire 
STEP Act likely violates due process because its terms are not “sufficiently explicit to 
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its 
penalties.”126 
123 Englebrecht at 756. 
 
124 Id.
125 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
 
126 Lanzetta at 453. 
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V.  THE ENHANCEMENT: FACILITATING WHAT, WHOM AND WHEN? 
 
Penal Code section 186.22(b) provides for enhanced penalties for defendants 
proven to have committed felonies “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 
with a criminal street gang,” and “with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in 
any criminal conduct by gang members.”127 
Although the language of the enhancement statute—“promote, further, or assist in 
any criminal conduct by gang members”—appears almost identical to the “willfully 
promotes, furthers or assists in any felonious conduct by members of that gang” language 
of subdivision (a) (the substantive “active participation” charge), the two provisions have 
been interpreted somewhat differently.  While the language in the (a) count refers to 
aiding and abetting a felony committed by gang members,128 the almost identical 
language in the (b) enhancement refers (at least, according to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals) to “facilitation”129 of “any criminal conduct by gang members.”130 
Until recently, the primary problem with the enhancement (apart from the lack of 
a statutory definition for the term “gang member”) has been one of attenuation; exactly 
how much of a nexus must be shown between the charged act and the facilitated criminal 
gang conduct?  In People v. Ferraez,131 the defendant was a member of a gang and was 
 
127 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(b) (West 2006). 
 
128 At least according the California Supreme Court in People v. Castaneda, 3 P.3d 278, 283 (Cal. 2000) .  
But see People v. Ngoun, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 837, 839-840 (2001); People v. Lamas, *Cal.Rptr.3d* (June 20, 
2006).  
 
129 See Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 
130 CAL. PEN. CODE § 186.22(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
131 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 640 (2003). 
 
27
selling drugs in a gang neighborhood with permission from the gang.132 Although it 
could be said that the defendant committed the offense “in association with a criminal 
street gang” by seeking the gang’s approval, there appeared to be no direct or 
circumstantial evidence that the defendant intended to “promote, further, or assist in any 
criminal conduct by gang members”; rather, the defendant appeared to be selling drugs 
purely for personal profit.133 This evidentiary deficit was easily remedied, however, by 
the testimony of the prosecution gang expert who testified to the effect that gang 
members typically sell drugs to raise money for criminal gang activity or to enhance the 
gang’s criminal reputation, therefore this gang member defendant intended just that.134 
Despite the faulty logic of this syllogism—akin to “most pets are cats; I have a pet dog; 
therefore my dog is a cat”—the court had no problem relying on the expert’s opinion to 
prove the ultimate issue of the defendant’s intent to facilitate criminal conduct by the 
gang.135 
As well as the all-purpose “enhancing the gang’s reputation” theory, prosecution 
experts also employ the equally versatile “protecting turf” theory to “prove” that an 
apparently self-serving crime was actually committed to facilitate gang activity.  The 
“turf” theory, however, was soundly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Garcia v. Carey.136 
In Garcia, the defendant proudly announced his gang affiliation while robbing his victim 
 
132 Ferraez at 645-646. 
 
133 Ferraez at 645. 
 
134 Ferraez at 643-644. 
 
135 Ferraez at 645-646.  But see People v. Killebrew, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876 (2002) (holding that it is 
generally improper for an expert to offer an opinion as to the ultimate issue of the defendant’s specific 
intent to further criminal gang activity). 
 
136 395 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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in a busy liquor store.137 The defendant was assisted by two other gang members.138 At 
trial, the prosecution gang expert testified that the robbery occurred on Garcia’s gang’s 
“turf,” and that the gang was “turf oriented.”139 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the evidence was insufficient to support an inference that Mr. Garcia robbed his 
victim “with the specific intent to facilitate other criminal conduct by the gang.”140 The 
court noted that there was nothing in the record connecting the “‘turf-oriented nature’ of 
the gang” with the commission of that robbery, nor was there any evidence that 
protection of turf enabled any other kind of criminal activity of the gang; the expert’s 
testimony was “singularly silent on what criminal activity of the gang was furthered or 
intended to be furthered by the robbery . . . .”141 
Not only have state courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s requirement of an 
articulable nexus between the charged offense and specific criminal gang activity, but the 
Second District Court of Appeal’s recent decision in People v. Romero142 conflicted with 
Garcia on another important aspect of the enhancement provision, holding that 
subdivision (b) “does not require intent to further criminal conduct beyond the charged 
crime.”143 
137 Garcia at 1101. 
 
138 Garcia at 1101. 
 
139 Garcia at 1101-02. 
 
140 Garcia at 1103. 
 
141 Id.
142 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 862 (2006). 
 
143 Romero at 864 (emphasis added).   
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In Romero, two gang members, Mr. Romero and Mr. Moreno, were convicted of 
murder, with a sustained enhancement under section 186.22(b). 
The Romero court reasoned, contrary to Garcia, that the “any criminal conduct” 
language of the statute could be applied to contemporaneous conduct of another gang 
member committing the same offense;144 each defendant acted in association with the 
gang and had the specific intent to assist in criminal gang conduct simply by virtue of 
assisting the other in the commission of the charged offense, even if the charged offense 
was not otherwise gang-related.  The Romero court cited People v. Morales145 in support 
of the position that when there is sufficient evidence that a defendant intended to commit 
a crime in association with other gang members, “it is fairly inferable that he intended to 
assist criminal conduct by his fellow gang members.”146 
The Romero court’s interpretation of subdivision (b) creates the potential for 
unjust and absurd results.147 What if Mr. Moreno were not a gang member?  Mr. Moreno 
would then be the only one out of the two defendants actually assisting a gang member, 
thus freeing Mr. Romero—the gang member—of  liability under the enhancement, and 
imposing liability instead upon Mr. Moreno—the non-gang member.  The only way 
around this unjust and absurd result would be to construe the holding of Romero to mean 
that one gang member can meet the “assist[ing] in any criminal conduct by gang 
members” element of the enhancement by assisting in his own commission of any crime 
as a gang member.  Such an interpretation would avoid the potential absurdity of a non-
 
144 Romero at 865. 
 
145 People v. Morales, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 (2003). 
 
146 Romero at 866 (citing People v. Morales, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 (2003).   
 
147 See Campbell v. Zolin, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 352 (1995) (“A statute must be construed so as to avoid an 
unjust and absurd result”). 
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gang member facing greater liability than a gang member for the same conduct, and 
would be in conformity with the Ngoun and Lamas courts’ application of the “promote, 
further, or assist” language of the subdivision (a) substantive count to lone gang members 
committing any crime.  However, this interpretation of the “promote, further, or assist” 
language—i.e., that a lone gang member could be subjected to additional punishment 
when committing a self-serving crime, simply by virtue of his unrelated gang 
affiliation—would appear to unconstitutionally punish mere membership in a gang when 
applied to the (b) enhancement.148 
The Romero court purported to cite People v. Morales149 in support of its position 
that crimes committed by multiple gang members presumptively satisfy all the 
requirements of the enhancement.  However, such reliance on Morales was somewhat 
selective.  The Morales court offered the following caveat, consistent with the notion that 
gang members (even when acting together) can commit self-serving crimes not intended 
to facilitate criminal gang conduct:  “[I]t is conceivable that several gang members could 
commit a crime together, yet be on a frolic and detour unrelated to the gang.”150 
The “frolic and detour” exception posited by the Morales court in dicta is 
something that should not be shoved into oblivion by Ferraez, Romero, and their 
inevitable progeny; despite attempts by the courts to validate the flawed logic of 
prosecution gang experts, it always has been and always will be entirely possible for gang 
 
148 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); People v. Castaneda, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000). 
 
149 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 615 (2003). 
 
150 Morales at 632.  See also Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (defendant must promote, 
further, or assist in other criminal activity of the gang apart from the charged crime); People v. Martinez, 10 
Cal.Rptr.3d 751 (2004) (a crime may not be found gang related based solely upon the defendant’s gang 
affiliations); In re Frank S. *Cal.Rptr.3d* (5th Dist., Aug. 1, 2006) (crimes may not be found to be gang-
related based solely upon a perpetrator’s gang affiliations). 
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members, acting alone or in groups, to commit self-serving crimes without any intent to 
facilitate criminal gang activity.  And it remains the prosecution’s burden to prove with 
competent evidence that the charged offense—not that particular type of offense, when 
committed by a gang member—was committed with the specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: A WAY OUT OF THE THICKET? 
 
The uniqueness of gang culture, the linguistic shoddiness of a statute cobbled 
together in a hasty response to a gang “crisis,” and the puzzling judicial interpretations of 
the STEP Act’s provisions by confused and frustrated courts have rendered the Act 
virtually impossible to apply in a fair and consistent manner.     
 The growing problems of interpretation, as shown by the continuing divergence of 
appellate opinions, can likely be solved only by a radical redrafting of the statute.  By far 
the largest flaw in the Act is the conspicuous lack of a definition of “gang member.”  An 
amendment to the statute to add a simple definition comparable to those used by law 
enforcement agencies when documenting gang members on the street would easily 
suffice.151 Also, the disagreement among appellate courts as to whether direct 
perpetration or only aiding and abetting satisfies the “assistance” prong of the substantive 
charge, and whether the enhancement requires facilitation of other criminal gang activity, 
could be resolved by resort to codification of the holdings of the higher courts, 
specifically the holding of Castaneda as to “aiding and abetting,” and the holding of 
Garcia v. Carey as to “other criminal gang activity.” 
 
151 Definitions of “gang member” based on law enforcement models are incorporated into anti-gang statutes 
in Arizona, Florida, South Dakota, and Tennessee.  Law enforcement classifications are typically based on 
the subject meeting two or more out of five to seven criteria such as self-admission, gang tattoos, prior 
adjudication for a gang offense, etc.  (See fn 122 supra.) 
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Eighteen years after the enactment of the STEP Act, there is still a dire need for 
comprehensible legislative and judicial standards in the war against gangs.  The recurring 
disagreement among the appellate courts is sufficient evidence that some of the state’s 
brightest legal scholars remain at odds as to the “plain meaning” of the statute. 
 As the gang crisis continues to grow, so does the need for clear legal standards to 
assist in the effort to quell that crisis.  It is not too late for courts and the legislature to 
map a way out of the thicket.  
 
